Scaling up pilot projects providing continuous water supply to households in Indian cities has proved challenging. This study identifies opportunities and barriers in scaling up, in order to derive recommendations for bridging the gap between testing policy innovations and bringing projects to scale. We analyse pilot design, required resources, and drivers of stakeholders, institutions and the environment for a case study in Karnataka and find a wide range of factors that affect adoption of 24/7 water supply. Upscaling should be tailor-made for each area, which requires space, scope and capacity to be created for local involvement.
Introduction
In Indian cities coverage of piped water supply systems is between 55 and 89 per cent, and while per capita availability is relatively high for a developing country, at 90 to 120 litres per day, no city yet offers a continuous water supply to all households (World Bank, 2014) . The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2007) found that the average duration of water supply in 20 Indian cities was only 4.3 hours per day. Water supply is further affected by low tariffs and cost recovery, poor metering, and high rates of non-revenue water (water that is lost through leakage and illegal connections). At the same time, Indian cities are rapidly growing. The United Nations (2014) project an additional 404 million urban dwellers by 2050. This will put additional strains on urban water supply systems (Cronin et al., 2014) . In a bid to tackle the erratic and widely varying difference in water supply provision amongst Indian cities, the Government of India mooted the idea of a 24-hour, continuous water supply at a workshop in 2003 (Water and Sanitation Program (WSP), 2010) . This idea became concrete in 2005 when the Government of Karnataka and the World Bank started the Karnataka Urban Water Sector Improvement Project (KUWASIP). The project involved sector development and technical assistance studies for urban water supply at the state and a local (urban) level, and it provided funding for investments in water supply. The investments were used to fund pilot projects in three cities 'to demonstrate that 24-hour continuous supply is achievable and to show the benefits -health, technical, operational and commercial -it brings' (World Bank, 2004, p. 8) . The pilot projects covered about 7 to 14 per cent of the populations in three cities: Belgaum, Gulbarga and the twin-city of Hubli-Dharwad. Households received continuous water supply starting in 2008, and in 2010 the project was successfully completed. Upscaling was foreseen to the entire city, to other cities in the state and ultimately to the entire country (Walters, 2013) . The government sanctioned upscaling of the projects in Karnataka in 2010. However, progress has been slow, with only a few projects targeting 24/7 water supply across India. This study analyses why scaling up the pilot projects has not taken off.
Providing continuous 24/7 water supply through piped networks has several advantages over intermittent water supply. Polluted wastewater from toilets, septic tanks and roadside drains can enter pipes that are not continuously pressurised (WSP, 2010) . Microbial water quality studies indeed confirm that higher concentrations of indicator bacteria are present in water from taps with an intermittent water supply (Andey & Kelkar, 2007; Kumpel & Nelson, 2013 ). Water quality is further affected when households store water in tanks and containers (Ayoub & Malaeb, 2006) . Water treatment costs by households and costs related to illness can be avoided when good-quality water is supplied. Intermittent water supply and limited household connections also mean that people -often women and children -need to spend time on collecting water from a shared neighbourhood standpipe (WSP, 2010) ; upgrading to a 24/7 service usually means that all households will get a connection in their home. From a technical perspective, intermittent supply leads to increased pumping costs and reduced lives of pipes and connections due to the changes in pressure (WSP, 2010) . Furthermore, because the supply systems are often designed for continuous supply, intermittent supply leads to low pressure if everyone opens a tap at the same time leading to unequal distribution of water (Vairavamoorthy et al., 2007) .
A common argument against continuous supply is the supposed increase in water consumption. In cities facing water scarcity -a common situation in India -intermittent supply may be seen as a demand reduction strategy. Fan et al. (2014) show that in rural China intermittent supply indeed reduces consumption. However, Andey & Kelkar (2009) find that when demands are met under intermittent supply, water consumption does not increase significantly under continuous supply. Other arguments against continuous water supply include assumed high costs, which may result in tariff increases that the poor cannot afford, and the argument that intermittent power supply needs to be fixed first for water supply plants to operate continuously (WSP, 2010) .
To demonstrate the advantages of continuous water supply and show that the arguments against it can be addressed, the KUWASIP was carried out as a pilot project. Pilot projects are often used in uncertain environments and, particularly in the development sector, they have been used to assess alternative courses of action (Nair & Howlett, 2015) . However, even for successful pilot projects, scaling up is challenging. Studies of scaling up mention or conclude that there is no blueprint, although some general guidelines and factors affecting successful upscaling can be distilled from an analysis of cases -which are often sector-specific (Davis & Iyer, 2002; Hartmann & Linn, 2008; Spicer et al., 2014) . Power relations and political economy factors play a role, alongside resource availability, proper pilot design and a shared understanding of goals and objectives (Davis & Iyer, 2002) . In the case of Karnataka these factors are all very relevant and can help explain why progress in scaling up is slow.
The objective of this paper is to identify the opportunities and barriers in scaling up to continuous urban water supply in India, through an analysis of the Karnataka case study. The potential for scaling up is evaluated against the practical realities using a framework derived from the upscaling literature. Existing studies of Walters (2013) and Mitra (2008) have analysed the Karnataka pilot study from the perspective of democratic processes, good governance and the policy discourse. While these are essential elements in understanding the success of pilot studies and why upscaling does or does not occur, we aim to provide a comprehensive overview of factors to be considered in the upscaling of 24/7 urban water supply, and provide guidance to policymakers on how to bridge the gap between testing innovation and bringing projects to scale.
In the next section the KUWASIP is described. This is followed by a brief section on the methodological approach. The subsequent literature review on scaling up pilot projects, with a focus on water projects, leads to an analysis framework for the Karnataka case covering the three cities. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of the opportunities and barriers in scaling up urban water supply. We end with our conclusions and policy recommendations.
Case: the KUWASIP
Karnataka is a state located in the south-western part of India (see Figure 1 ) and has about 61 million inhabitants in 30 districts (Government of India (GoI), 2011a). In 2005, the Government of Karnataka in partnership with the World Bank initiated the KUWASIP. At that time, the state was considered as one of the more reform-minded states in India. The cities of Gulbarga, Belgaum and Hubli-Dharwad were selected for piloting 24/7 water supply (see Figure 1) . The two key components of the project were technical assistance studies for urban water supply at the state and city level, and the development and operation of pilot water supply systems for continuous water supply in selected parts of each city. The targeted beneficiaries of the project were about 200,000 people living in five pilot zones (two in Hubli-Dharwad, two in Belgaum and one in Gulbarga), equalling 7 to 14 per cent of the population in each city (World Bank, 2004) . The pilot projects were part of a larger project that included investments in bulk water supply and setting up of a State Urban Water and Sanitation Council (WSP, 2010) . The total project had a value of US$52.7 million of which the World Bank provided US$40.4 million as a loan.
The technical studies involved review and adjustment or establishment of regulatory frameworks, strengthening of urban water supply delivery in cities, creation of water and sanitation information systems and benchmarking systems, and tariff design for continuous water supply. All the technical assistance studies were carried out through consultancy firms selected by competitive bidding. The development and supervision of pilot water supply systems were carried out by the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board (KUWSDB) and operated by a private company. The contract was won by Compagnie Générale des Eaux (Veolia) of France, and covered consultancy services for the investments in the water supply systems and a two-year, performance-based operation of the systems. The consultant advised replacement of the entire distribution network, which solved the problem of massive leakage and illegal connections in the network (WSP, 2010) . The pilot sites were hydraulically isolated, i.e. disconnected from the rest of the water supply network, and meters were installed for all connections. In terms of performance indicators, the project was a success, as indicated in Table 1 . Supply went up to 24/7 and the number of household connections increased by more than 50 per cent, making standposts and hand pumps unnecessary. The volume of water supplied reduced as losses through leaking pipes reduced and possibly storage losses in households reduced. 
Methodological approach and data collection
To identify opportunities and barriers in scaling up of 24/7 water supply, this study followed a qualitative approach, consisting of two parts. The first part was the development of a framework for analysis based on a literature review on upscaling of pilot projects and policy experiments. The framework provides the elements in which the different factors (opportunities and barriers) to be considered in upscaling can be placed.
The second part was the analysis of the Karnataka case study. Multiple strategies to collect information on the pilots in Karnataka and the situation of continuous water supply in India were used. Primary information was collected in field visits and semi-structured interviews with government officials. A semi-structured interview is a qualitative research method that combines a predetermined set of open questions with the possibility of exploring a particular theme or responses further (Bernard, 2006) . The field visits were conducted in late 2014 in the pilot areas. During the field visits information on the water supply situation and pilot projects was first collected through discussions with residents. The discussions were deliberately kept informal, allowing for a broad range of observations, not bounded by preconceived assumptions or ideas, and allowed residents to speak more freely. Following the discussions, about 10 residents were asked to fill in a questionnaire with open-ended questions about service levels, residents' requirements, transparency and accountability. For the interviews, five government officials at different levels and close to the Karnataka projects were approached. A set of interview questions was prepared, which was used as a guide in each interview. The guide provided a checklist for discussion topics and covered a broad range of opportunities and barriers in upscaling continuous water supply, including an open question to probe for opportunities and challenges that may not have been included in the interview questions. Discussion topics included: technical challenges; stakeholder interactions; regulatory framework questions addressing laws, access levels, prices and investments; and questions related to governance including aspects on accountability and transparency. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the issues, all respondents remain anonymous and interviews were not recorded, but one of the interviewers took notes, which were elaborated directly after the interview. Finally, secondary information was collected from open literature, such as project reports and academic literature. The secondary sources used are mentioned throughout this paper.
The qualitative approach allowed understanding of the negotiation between different actors responding to unique combinations of financial and political factors, underpinning decision-making logics, and understanding various public-sector reforms and their relationships and institutional set-ups. An overview of the main opportunities and barriers resulted from the analysis for each of the elements in the framework developed in the next section.
A framework to analyse opportunities and barriers for scaling up pilot projects Hartmann & Linn (2008, p. 8) define scaling up as 'expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programmes or projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people'. In scaling up, stakeholders will be interested in the quality, magnitude, beneficiaries and time period of the impact. Scaling up is the execution of change. Studies by the World Bank have suggested scaling up as one of the main challenges to its investment in development programmes (Davis & Iyer, 2002; Jonasova & Cooke, 2012) . One of the key drivers of scaling up water supply projects is to improve public health and provide economic growth in cities. Innovations and changes in providing access to clean water are failures unless they can be scaled up to make a difference in the lives of many people living in poverty.
Scaling up water projects is particularly complex: water is essential for life and, as such, social and ethical arguments are voiced strongly -often in response to economic arguments. Indeed, in Karnataka there is a 'prevalent view that water should be a free good' (Walters, 2013, p. 19 , quoting a consultancy report). This goes against the ideas introduced in pilot projects. Hence, scaling up not only concerns sustainability and impact, but is also about adaption and a multidimensional process of change.
There are no recognised hypotheses or theories on scaling up pilot projects, but there is an emerging number of analyses that propose guidelines or a framework for analysing and planning of scaling up (e.g. Davis & Iyer, 2002; Hartmann & Linn, 2008; Jonasova & Cooke, 2012) and a large number of case studies on upscaling in, particularly, the water and health sectors in developing economies (e.g. Adomako-Adjei, 2008; Enwelu, 2012; Spicer et al., 2014) . Although no specific theoretical literature on upscaling pilot projects is available, literature on upscaling of policy experiments, which focuses on the role and place of experiments, provides a broader context. Policy experiments can be useful to evaluate complex policy issues in situations of uncertainty (Nair & Howlett, 2015) . Through policy experiments ex-ante evaluation of policies is possible and knowledge from experiments can be used during actual implementation. However, making the connection between experiments and policy is challenging (Stoker, 2010) . The policy experiment itself is surrounded by problems. Nair & Howlett (2015) identify three challenges in policy experimentation. The first challenge is the influence of politics and key stakeholders on the design and evaluation of experiments. Stakeholders may have different goals, such as demonstrating that a policy can work, or helping a group of people to benefit from a pilot. This can affect an objective, representative design of an experiment. The second challenge is the technical evaluation of an experiment. Policies affect people and a laboratory design is not possible; causalities may not be clear and additional influences can affect the outcomes. Furthermore, interpretation of results can be biased by stakeholders' objectives. The third challenge is issues in the diffusion of experiments and retaining lessons drawn from them. Experiments are often very context-specific and upscaling over time and space may encounter different conditions from those in the original experiment.
Literature with a practical orientation and case studies of upscaling provide different factors or taxonomies of factors for scaling up pilot projects. Drawing on an analysis of rural water supply, Davis & Iyer (2002) identify four categories of factors that enable scaling up:
1. Resources: availability of adequate funding, human capital, institutional capacity and other resources needed for a project on a larger scale. 2. Knowledge and shared understanding: stakeholders should have a common view of the objectives and content of a policy, as well as of the processes, including allocation of roles and responsibilities. 3. Resistance: new policies often clash with entrenched ideas; new initiatives must be championed by influential decision-makers, and a good understanding of all stakeholders' motivations to support, or not support, the project should be obtained. 4. Implementation conditions: successful pilots may encounter difficulties when scaling up because of unique features of the pilot, including pilot location, pilot policy framework and pilot institutional setting. This category links to the challenges identified by Nair & Howlett (2015) . Hartmann & Linn (2008) conclude that the most critical factors are neither resources nor technical factors, but organisational, political and motivational factors. Their categorisation in seven common building blocks for successful upscaling focuses on these elements and the project process of scaling up: (1) applying leadership, vision and values; (2) managing political constituencies, i.e. actively engaging political players; (3) ensuring supportive policies; (4) developing institutions that are willing and able to support change; (5) creating incentives and accountability of stakeholders; (6) practising effective monitoring and evaluation; and (7) planning for an orderly and gradual process.
Related to the analysis by Hartmann & Linn (2008) , another lens through which upscaling of pilot projects can be analysed is governance and political economy analysis (Fritz et al., 2009) , which focuses on the context in which upscaling pilot projects is happening. Similar to the frameworks described above, governance and political economy analysis aims to identify the factors that are obstacles or drivers of change, and does so by analysing the interactions between political and economic processes in society, and actors' power, interests and motivations. The analysis distinguishes three clusters of drivers (Fritz et al., 2009 ). The structural drivers, which are mostly beyond control of the actors and change slowly over time, are things such as climate and status of poverty. The institutional drivers define the 'rules of the game' and can be formal, such as laws and regulations, as well as informal, such as cultural norms and social behaviour. Institutions are the product of historical factors and conscious policy decisions over time. As local conditions change, the institutions will be affected and may accommodate or resist change. The third cluster of drivers is that of the actors, or stakeholders, that are the individuals and organisations that drive change. This includes politicians, donor agencies, civil servants and political parties. The exact definition of the elements in the three clusters depends on the topic being studied: political analysis can be carried out at different levels, such as country level and project level.
A final point from the literature that should be mentioned is the selection of dimensions and scale of scaling up. The dimension can refer to the geographical space (for instance, upscaling to more clients in an area, upscaling to another area), functional dimensions (providing more services) or organisational level (from provincial to national level). The scale refers to the ultimate target population. A realistic pathway and time horizon to go from pilot scale to the ultimate target scale should be defined.
Based on the discussion above, we define a framework for analysis to identify opportunities and barriers for scaling up 24/7 urban water supply in India based on the case of Karnataka. From the outside, the pilot projects seem a success: the projects 'have shown that a well-operated water supply system can deliver water supply 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in Indian cities, bringing an affordable, reliable service to urban households including the poorest' (WSP, 2010, p. 1). Analysis by Mitra (2008) and Walters (2013) indicates, however, that the situation in the pilot projects was more complex, involving (un)democratic processes and power dynamics, particularly related to the situation of the poor.
The analysis in the present study focuses on providing a comprehensive overview of factors to be considered in upscaling to continuous water supply rather than critically evaluating the pilot study. Still, a good understanding of the Karnataka pilot study is required to distil useful lessons for upscaling. Hence, the first element of the framework is a critical review of the pilot design, see Figure 2 . The challenges identified by Nair & Howlett (2015) guide the review. A private company designed and operated the water supply network in the Karnataka pilot study. Since the early 1990s Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in water supply operations have been used as a model to improve service delivery in India (World Bank, 2014) , and the importance placed upon it for delivery on 24/7 water supply warrants a separate discussion in the framework.
The second element in our framework, on the right-hand side in Figure 2 , is resources and technical issues. As mentioned in Davis & Iyer (2002) , adequate funding, human capital and other resources need to be in place. Similarly, technical issues, such as bulk water supply, need to be addressed for continuous water supply to work. The central and third element in the framework is factors related to stakeholders, institutions and the environment. This is the most complex element of the analysis due to the multitude of factors and interactions at different levels. The clusters of drivers from political economy analysis are the objects of analysis: stakeholders (actors), institutions and the environment (or structural drivers). The factors for scaling up found by Davis & Iyer (2002) and Hartmann & Linn (2008) form the topics of the analysis.
Analysis and discussion

Stakeholders -an overview
The KUWASIP was a large, complex project with many people and organisations involved. Figure 3 gives a simplified project organogram that can aid understanding of the discussion below. The World Bank provided the loan for the pilot projects, which was supplemented by grants and subsidies from the Government of Karnataka. The World Bank also provided expertise on project delivery, social intermediation and communication to the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation (KUIDFC), which was the project implementation agency, responsible for project execution, financial management, procurement and reporting. KUWSDB manages bulk water supply and acted as executing agency under the project. In this role it was responsible for design, procurement, construction, and supervision of the investments in the water supply network. KUWSDB was supported by the operator consultant (Veolia), which developed the required investment programmes to transform and refurbish the existing systems to deliver continuous pressurised water. The second role of Veolia was operating and managing the water supply systems in the pilot zones for two years, including sending bills to customers on a volumetric basis. Collection of the bills is carried out by the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). The ULBs also had the responsibility of providing adequate bulk water to meet their obligations, deputing employees to the operator, and managing the interface with the customers. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were engaged for the implementation of a communication strategy. Several consultants were hired for legal services, institutional advice, and aspects of engineering.
KUWASIP -pilot project design
The Karnataka pilot project had the objective of demonstrating that 24/7 water supply was possible in Indian cities. As such, the pilot study was, as a policy experiment, not very well designed in terms of getting an objective, representative outcome. Most of the stakeholders in the project had very strong reasons for the project to be a success -otherwise it would not have met its objective of being a demonstration project for upscaling. The pilot sites were carefully selected from areas that had sufficient bulk water and minimal pumping requirements between reservoirs and demonstration zones, to reduce the impact of power outages (Walters, 2013) . Choosing five smaller pilot zones rather than one large site could have been a strategy to reduce project failure. The selection of zones was also influenced by the political and social make-up of neighbourhoods (Walters, 2013) . Furthermore, unarticulated reasons, such as personal connections with sub-local administrators, may also have played a role.
From a technical view, the project can be evaluated as successful. Communications by the World Bank (2014, p. 10) and its Water and Sanitation Program (WSP, 2010) have touted the project as a model for other cities. While Walters (2013), Mitra (2008) and Sangameswaran et al. (2008) do not question the technical success, they do question the process followed in the pilots. Public standposts were removed, hence the poor had no choice but to accept a household connection. In the construction phase of the project, people in Dharwad demonstrated against the lack of transparency in the project, and there were issues regarding tariffs, connection charges and billing. Hence, from the view of the households, and especially the poor, the project may not have been such a success.
Due to the specific design of the pilot projects, upscaling to continuous water supply could face different issues elsewhere. GoI (2011b) notes that the Karnataka project took seven years to reach 10 per cent of the people in the pilot cities; reaching the other 90 per cent will take significant efforts and cost. Furthermore, the pilot projects are not able to recover their costs, which will be unsustainable for ULBs at a larger scale. In addition, complementary investments in sewerage systems are required when water use increases. Barriers in upscaling will be discussed further below, but the fact that continuous water supply has not been adopted at a larger scale could indicate that the pilots have not been objective and representative of the situation elsewhere in Karnataka and India.
PPP in urban water supply
The Karnataka pilot project had a significant role for a private sector consultant operator. Upscaling would also require considerable involvement of the private sector, although the involvement of private parties in the water sector in India is controversial (Wu et al., 2016) . Hence, a brief discussion on PPPs is required.
From the early 2000s the focus of PPPs in water supply shifted from bulk water supply to operation and maintenance of water distribution (World Bank, 2014). As most distribution systems run below cost recovery, financing assistance was envisaged from the international donor agencies and state governments, in addition to private funding. Development of a well-structured PPP contract, clear risksharing mechanisms, baseline data verification, and development of a capital refurbishment plan proved to be beneficial for the success of PPP projects. Of the 15 PPP contracts awarded in India between 2005 and 2011, 10 addressed distribution improvements. The projects have seen an increasing participation of domestic private parties. The KUWASIP has had a significant impact on PPPs in India as it demonstrated use of minimal public funding to keep costs low, a focus on distribution, and maximising efficiency gains from private sector expertise (although this latter point has more dimensions, such as institutional weakness leading to inefficiency in public agencies, and public agencies having to pick up tasks not covered in PPP contracts, see Sangameswaran et al. (2008) ). While some progress has been made in PPPs, private involvement in the urban water sector remains minimal: the private sector share was expected to be less than two per cent during 2012 (GoI, 2011b .
The involvement of the private sector in water supply in India has proponents and opponents. Proponents of privatisation conceive water as an economic good that must be priced in market terms to promote equity and resource sustainability. Opponents of privatisation conceive water as a human right that should not be privately owned and whose access must not depend on the ability to pay. Even though privatisation and PPPs are not the same and water resources and assets can remain in public ownership under PPP arrangements, discussions on private sector involvement are ongoing and complex, with various arguments posed by proponents and opponents. Still, PPPs will be a likely model in upscaling to 24/7 water supply. The overall investment required in the urban water supply sector is estimated at INR3.2 trillion (US$237 million) for the period 2012-2031 (High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC), 2011). Without private sector investments, this amount will be difficult to achieve -although GoI (2011b) questions whether private initiatives 'will bring much needed investments' (p. 13).
Resources and technical issues
Upscaling requires adequate resources, including financial, human, institutional, and natural resources. Lack of resources is often mentioned as a barrier in upscaling (e.g. Davis & Iyer, 2002; GoI, 2011b) . In addition, technical issues must be addressed before upscaling is possible.
The KUWASIP was funded by a World Bank loan and the Government of Karnataka. Considering the budget of US$52.7 million to reach 200,000 people, reaching the 24 million urban residents in the State of Karnataka would require large amounts of funding. Moreover, funding is also required for operation and maintenance of the water supply networks as long as it cannot be covered from the revenuesabout 67 per cent of the operation and maintenance costs were recovered in the pilot projects. Given the financial constraints of ULBs, different sources of funding will be required for scaling up water supply across different cities. Funding can come from various arrangements: funds sanctioned under urban reforms such as the Smart City projects, Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY), multilateral organisations, state governments, PPPs, financial intermediaries and private equity arrangements.
Schemes such as Smart City Programme, AMRUT and other government funding projects are being relied upon extensively for the development of PPP projects in the urban water supply sector. The share of public funding in these projects has increased considerably. This has led to an increase in the viability of private sector participation in various areas (redress of customer complaints, efficiency improvements, metering, upgrading and maintaining existing urban infrastructure). Still, funding from the private sector continues to be small when compared to other sectors.
Financial intermediaries, such as Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund (TNUDF) and KUIDFC, were set up at state level to attract private capital and multilateral organisations into urban infrastructure projects, and facilitate the better performing ULBs to access capital markets, in addition to strengthening the financial, managerial and technical capabilities of ULBs. Other initiatives by states include the Water and Sanitation Pooled Fund (WSPF), which acts on behalf of the state government to identify feasible projects for funding by weaker ULBs. A debt service facility was also set up to ensure that the WSPF can continue to pay its creditors even when municipal borrowers fail to repay their loans.
In recent years, multilateral agencies such as the Water and Sanitation Program of the World Bank (Karnataka pilot project), Japan International Cooperation Agency (Delhi water supply) and Asian Development Bank (Rajasthan) have provided loans for implementing urban water supply projects.
Besides loans they have also provided services to improve the public service delivery for ULBs. This will continue to be a key enabler for investment in the water supply sector.
In summary, there are several funding options, although gradual steps need to be taken, as the required funding for upscaling to continuous water supply following the Karnataka pilot project model would be enormous.
Human resources are another critical component in upscaling. Finding skilled people for the various tasks -ranging from welding pipes to hydraulic modelling and managing project finance -in developing and running a continuous water supply system can be challenging. In the KUWASIP attention was paid to capacity building. Welding of high-density polyethylene pipes was a new skill that the contractor's employees had to learn from foreign consultants. KUWSDB and ULB staff were deputed to the project so that the foreign operator consultant could transfer their knowledge of operating and managing a 24/7 water supply system to them. The World Bank supported KUIDFC with expert knowledge on project management and social intermediation. Yet, technical tasks are more standardised than skills required for social intermediation and communication. Davis & Iyer (2002) found that in many projects this was mentioned as a barrier to upscaling. The Karnataka pilot projects required intensive internal and external communication. Also, on the side of the opponents of 24/7 water supply, there was no good capacity to effectively communicate and voice their opinion. Hence, finding people and developing skills for social intermediation and communication can be a barrier to upscaling.
Linked to human resources are institutional resources required for upscaling. The Karnataka project involved a reorganisation of tasks and responsibilities of agencies. Although political economy aspects of this are discussed below, it is important to mention here that agencies at all levels need to be enabled and prepared to assume new roles in 24/7 water supply. The KUWASIP may not be representative of the institutional set-up for upscaling, as involvement of the World Bank and the fact that it was a demonstration project positioned it higher in the governmental organisation hierarchy with a central role for KUIDFC. Scaling up would require more from ULBs, which are often considered lacking in capacity.
A main technical issue is provision of adequate water resources. It is estimated that the overall amount of water supplied to the pilot zones reduced by about 10 per cent (WSP, 2010) , negating fears that continuous water supply would increase the pressure on the scarce water resources. Evidence from the literature discussed above gives a mixed picture. The balance between reduction in physical losses in the distribution system versus increased consumption is also location-specific, depending on the state of the network and existing supply. Moreover, most losses currently occur in the bulk water supply; improvements in the distribution need complementary investments in bulk water supply to address bulk water shortages. In any case, as a part of upscaling to 24/7 water supply, an assessment of the available water resources needs to be carried out and bulk water supply needs to be ensured.
Before the pilot projects started, there was incomplete information on things like existing assets and existing water supplied, which complicated the hydraulic design of the new system. Upscaling projects need to allocate sufficient time to collect sufficient information to develop effective and efficient water supply networks. Another technical issue is that in Karnataka and India there was limited availability of pipes, meters and other equipment required for 24/7 water supply and meeting the standards used in the pilot projects, which made (relatively expensive) imports necessary (WSP, 2010) . Upscaling would also likely attract new suppliers to the market but as long as there is not sufficient demand for equipment that meets the specifications for 24/7 water supply this will be a barrier.
Stakeholders, institutions and environment
Opportunities and barriers in pilot design, resources, and technical issues are relatively easy to identify and follow directly from experience in the pilot projects. The political economy drivers related to stakeholders, institutions and the environment are interrelated, complex and often not articulated. To analyse these factors in the KUWASIP, we use the first five factors from Hartmann & Linn (2008) as a guide in this section. To recall, these factors can be summarised with the keywords: (1) leadership; (2) engagement; (3) supportive policies; (4) supportive institutions; and (5) incentives and accountability. Compared to Hartmann & Linn (2008) the scope of the present analysis is broader as we place more emphasis on stakeholders and institutions rather than having a project process perspective.
Leadership means that there are people and organisations with a vision and the right values to drive scaling up and act as a 'change agent'. The World Bank played a key role in the KUWASIP with their vision to demonstrate that 24/7 water supply is possible in Indian cities, while the State of Karnataka provided a good environment for a pilot being a forerunner in market-oriented reform in India. The state-level agencies shared the vision of providing 24/7 water supply. KUIDFC's role in the KUWASIP was important for the success of the project: the multilateral funds for water reform programmes are channelled through this agency and hence it has an important role in implementation. The managing director of KUIDFC, who championed the KUWASIP, and a team of bureaucrats heading state-level agencies had a shared vision of reforming urban water supply in Karnataka and had sufficient power to push reforms (Walters, 2013) . This made the KUWASIP a project with a rather top-down approach. Leadership at lower levels may have been lacking due to disengagement or disagreement, resulting in inconsistent communication, for instance about costs of water connections and tariffs for continuous water supply.
One of the main arguments against 24/7 water supply is that it will lead to higher water costs, which the poor may not be able to afford. The pilot projects introduced an increasing block tariff based on meter readings, which replaced an unmetered flat tariff. In Dharwad the opposition movement was the strongest of all pilot sites. Residents criticised the local government, stating that they were not properly informed about the project, including the water tariff setting mechanism. In addition, they questioned why the pilot project was in an area that already had a water supply rather than serving an uncovered area, alleged that the pilot sites were selected based on paying capacity of the population, and raised objections against implementation by a private, foreign operator. Hence, local government and the NGO engaged for communication had to work hard to convince the people that the private company would only operate and maintain the network, and that tariffs would be set by the ULB and take into account the situation of the poor. However, the ULB also had to take into account issues such as cost recovery in their tariff decisions. During the construction phase many illegal water connections made the situation even more complex, as those households would not enjoy a connection subsidy. Fearing that too many households would not be connected and people would lose access to water supply, this issue was ultimately resolved by asking for a nominal connection fee. While under pressure, the communication of the ULB in Dharwad became inconsistent. On the contrary, the ULB of Gulbarga allowed consumers to be charged for months at the prevailing water tariff while receiving dummy bills based on the new volumetric tariff. This allowed households to get used to the new situation and see impacts of adjusting their consumption. Again, another situation occurred in Belgaum, where arguments over paying arrears from before the project resulted in a bill collection efficiency of only 60 per cent, as compared to 99 per cent in Hubli-Dharwad and Gulbarga in 2010. All this shows that local situations differ and need to be understood thoroughly when upscaling the pilot projects. Engagement (the second factor) of local administration levels is important, as they are closest to the consumers and need to support the institutional changes.
Urban water supply projects involve many stakeholders as everyone consumes water and production of water involves many agencies. Engagement of every stakeholder is important, even though not all may support the project. Examples mentioned in WSP (2010) are the low-income cattle owners who used to pay a flat fee for unlimited use of water. They still do not support 24/7 water supply and have to fall back on using handpump groundwater. Many of the valvemen -ULB staff who were required to operate the network under intermittent supply -did not want work for a private company and only few of the employees who were trained remained with the operator.
The third factor is supportive policies. The policy framework -including laws, regulations and norms -needs to be in order for 24/7 water supply. The KUWASIP included a legal review of laws and policies for compatibility with the project. This resulted in some legislative changes, particularly on the role of the private sector in water supply.
Scaling up needs institutions that are supportive to change (fourth factor). The Government of Karnataka is considered at the forefront of market-oriented reform in India. KUIDFC played a key role supporting the pilot projects. Yet, urban water governance includes other institutions in Karnataka: ULBs, KUWSDB, the Urban Development Department, the Directorate of Municipal Administration, while Bangalore has a separate governance structure. Clear, non-overlapping mandates are required. Upscaling requires coordination at the state level, hence KUIDFC could remain to play a leading role. However, implementation takes place at the local level, hence ULBs should also be supportive. This is possible only if the institutions and the people in the institutions have the right incentives and accountability (fifth factor). Upscaling can be easily stalled by unwilling players (Hartmann & Linn, 2008) . ULB staff may resist change without adequate incentives: indeed, engineers from KUWSDB joined protests against the pilot projects (Walters, 2013) and ULB staff did not like to be deputed to a private company. Addressing these issues requires communication and provision of incentives for stakeholders to support the projects. On the other hand, accountability is required to meet the project's objectives. Incentivised people and organisations should have responsibility for milestones in the project. Table 2 provides an overview of the opportunities and barriers identified in the discussion above. Barriers can in some cases be addressed relatively easily -for instance, capacity building can address human resources issues -although other barriers will be more difficult to address. Considering all factors discussed, scaling up should find a balance between desired outcomes, practical realities and a range of constraints. It requires a process that aims to accomplish better public service delivery, rather than imposing additional burdens on the existing fragile public sector. Scaling up is about effectiveness (developing a solution that works), efficiency (finding a way to deliver the solution at an affordable cost) and expansion, replication and collaboration (developing a way to provide the solution on a larger scale). Pilot studies play an important role in effectiveness and efficiency, but do not provide a blueprint due to diverse local conditions. A scaling-up strategy, once designed, is not something that should be precisely adhered to. Parts of it may need revision as circumstances change or because new factors or changed conditions appear. Scaling-up interventions need to take a step-by-step approach as they might need to face different kinds of bottlenecks as the project moves on to the next stage.
Towards upscaling
Conclusion and recommendations
The aim of this study is to identify barriers and opportunities in scaling up to 24/7 water supply in Indian cities. The Karnataka case study provides a list of barriers and opportunities, and it has become clear that there is no one-size-fits-all intervention. Local conditions, including the drivers of local stakeholders and institutions, vary considerably. Upscaling should be tailor-made for each area, which requires space, scope and capacity to be created for local involvement of ULBs and residents. Focusing only on a few types of interventions is not sufficient, as upscaling is a multifaceted process of change and adoption. Here, we would like to list the main lessons that, based on our analysis, are essential for scaling up.
• Create value for all stakeholders. The health, social and economic benefits of 24/7 water supply have been demonstrated in several studies and the KUWASIP. However, different stakeholders in different areas experience benefits to varying extents, and some of the water reforms may not appeal to all stakeholders. There is a need to package and present policy decisions in diverse ways, not only for ▪ Lacking leadership at lower levels ▪ Use of dummy bills in the tariff transition process ▪ Higher water tariffs and illegal connections ▪ Appropriate set of incentives and accountability different types of consumers, but also for agency staff. Being burdened with additional or new tasks without any value creation will result in resistance. In every change process, there will be winners and losers; careful stakeholder analysis should identify losers and try to address their losses.
• Communicate the costs clearly. In Indian cities, water supply is subsidised significantly and no one would like to pay more than he or she is doing now. Introducing 24/7 water supply provides a good opportunity to reduce the gap between costs and revenues as a better product will be delivered, which can be used as an argument to increase tariffs. However, connection costs, the new tariff structure and development of tariffs over time should be clear from the start. It should also be clear what happens with illegal connections. Using dummy bills in the first months of operation of continuous water supply is a good means to let people get used to new tariffs.
• Scale up gradually. From different perspectives, upscaling will need to be a gradual process. From a funding perspective, the requirements are very large and different funding options will need to be used over time. From a human and institutional resources perspective, it is also not possible to scale up too fast. Experience needs to be transferred from a small group and will disseminate slowly. The pilot projects were carried out in the most viable locations. This strategy can continue to be followed, as more successful demonstrations will lead greater following. However, care should be taken that no large divide occurs between areas that are served and not served, especially when the areas not served are the poorer areas. Projects upgrading bulk water supply could partially address this as they will benefit all consumers.
• Place governance, responsibility and accountability at the correct level. KUIDFC played a leading role in the Karnataka pilots. It has, however, no local-level representation. The ULBs deal directly with the residents and had to implement the projects, even though they were merely executing higher-level orders. These governance aspects are complex and cannot be separated from general public administration and politics. Yet, as upscaling needs to be tailored to local conditions, empowering ULBs, giving them appropriate responsibility and holding them accountable for results, is essential for success. This needs to be supported by strong coordination and leadership at state and national levels.
